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Is the U.N. Becoming a Global Nanny? 
The Case of Consumer Protection Guidelines 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Without the American public realizing it, 
the United Nations and other international 
organizations are engaged in a massive ex-
pansion in government regulation of private 
sector economic activity. To develop this 
point, I would like to focus on one specific 
example, the U.N.'s draft Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection. 
Mine is an unenviable task. How could 
anyone possibly oppose guidelines that are 
designed to protect the consumer? It takes 
a hard heart to question the proposed 
United Nations' promulgation of such good 
things as product safety and purity, con-
sumer education, and international coopera-
tion. 
Yet, sadly, when you push aside the ver-
biage customary in international position 
papers, you quickly find that the "Draft 
Guidelines for Consumer Protection," now 
before the U.N.'s Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), would flunk a truth-in-
labeling test. Indeed, the so-called Guide-
lines have the makings of a blueprint for a 
more centrally directed society than now 
exists in any of the market-oriented 
economies in the world. The fact is, these 
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search for this statement. 
Guidelines are a part of a growing move-
ment to use the U.N. and othe1- interna-
tional agencies to expand government con-
trol over the private sector. 
When we look beyond the label, it is ap-
parent that the Guidelines are a model of 
vagueness and over-blown phraseology. 
Grand and unusual goals are set forth in 
sweeping language that is, at best, highly 
generalized and unclear. Attempts to carry 
out these Guidelines would surely result in 
worldwide confusion. 
In any event, the Guidelines likely would 
interfere with the goal of open international 
The Guidelines for C011swner Protection are 
part of a growi11g movement to use the U.N. 
to expand government control over the 
private sector 
trade by establishing a new set of non-tariff 
barriers. Some parts of this code of conduct 
would impose burdensome and costly con-
trols on the world's economies-and would 
tend to close, rather than open up, interna-
tional markets. It is my belief that the 
United States and many other nations would 
be inviting disenchantment, as well as 
substantial costs, if they were to adopt this 
proposal. Above all, consumers themselves 
would be hurt rather than protected. 
In addition, the Guidelines show the 
United Nations to be drifting further away 
from its fundamental and crucial goal of 
promoting and maintaining world peace. By 
seeking to regulate the commerce and inter-
nal economic activities of its member na-
tions, the U.N. is stepping into areas that are 
properly left to individual countries. 
Furthermore, the U.N. is diverting its limited 
resources from its basic role of peacekeeper. 
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Implications of the Guidelines 
The Draft Guidelines for Consumer Protec-
tion contain, first of all, seven objectives 
which are written "with special emphasis 011 
the 11eeds of developi11g 11ations." The objec-
tives are, almost necessarily, quite general in 
nature. Several of them are particularly 
problematic. For example, one objective is 
"to facilitate production patterns geared to 
meeting the most important needs of con-
swners." In economies organized along 
private enterprise lines, the needs of con-
sumers are always the strongest influence 
on "production patterns"; the pressures of 
the marketplace dictate that. But the Guide-
lines suggest the need for a controlled, 
highly centralized economy in which con-
sumer choices are in practice limited by the 
decisions of an all-wise government. This 
objective strongly implies that a central 
government must identify, and then control, 
the means of achieving the "most important 
needs" of consumers. We need only consult 
the dismal record of any of the world's 
We need 011ly co11sult the dismal record of 
a11y of the world's communist, centrally 
plm111ed economies to know that the U.N. 
Guidelines would severely hurt the 
developi11g 11atio11s 
communist, centrally planned economies in 
feeding and meeting other essential needs of 
their citizens to know that promulgating this 
objective would severely hurt, rather than 
help, the developing nations. 
Moreover, this objective overlooks the 
importance of world trade in meeting the 
needs of consumers. More than ever before, 
the more developed nations gear production 
for international markets rather than for the 
so-called "more important needs" of their 
own consumers. The case of Japan is 
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instructive. If its post-war economy had been 
limited to meeting the needs of its own 
population, it surely would not enjoy the 
influence in world markets and the high 
standard of living that it has today. The 
same holds true for other market economies 
mnging from West Germany to Hong Kong. ' 
Let me quote a second sweeping and ill-
conceived objective of the Guidelines: 
To curb business practices at the national 
a11d international levels which adversely 
affect consumers (including abuses of a 
domi11ant position of market power by 
private and public enterprises). 
Surely we all deplore business abuses, but 
how do we define business practices that 
"adversely affect consumers"? And who 
defines them? It is possible that a so-called 
"adverse effect" in India or Zaire would 
instead be a salutary effect for consumers in 
the Caribbean or Colombia. Comparative ef-
fects make it extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, to carve in stone what is a "good" 
product or service and what is "bad." 
Moreover, nearly any product or business 
practice may be arbitrarily labeled 
"abusive" when it is held up against a 
standard that cannot be achieved or which 
consumers do not wish to pay for. Under the 
proposed Guidelines, for example, Brand X 
Soap might be held to "adversely affect" 
consumers simply because it does not have 
the "ideal" qualities of Brand Y Soap. And 
where would this kind of thinking lead us? 
In many ways, this objective is a Pandora's 
box which, once opened, could be used to 
limit the choices of consumers around the 
world. It could even be used as a justifica-
tion for erecting trade barriers, or strength-
ening barriers that already exist. 
Other objectives in the Guidelines are 
equally troubling when we consider their 
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far-reaching nature. Here is an example: 
To promote just, equitable and sustainable 
eco11omic and social developme11t. 
This is an imposing, high-minded ideal. But 
who is going to define what is "just" and 
"equitable" in any specific instance? Also, 
who is going to decide-and then control-
what is "sustainable" development? And 
here is another "objective": 
To establish stm1dards of ethical co11duct 
for those engaged in production and 
distribution of goods and services to 
COI1SW11ers. 
Certainly, ethical conduct is laudatory. But 
who will set the standards of "ethical con-
duct"? Who will place themselves above all 
others and regulate private behavior? I 
shudder to think how substantially a totali-
tarian interpretation of ethical conduct 
would differ from that of a free society. 
The draft Guidelines also contain a set of 
general principles that governments are 
called upon to follow "to develop or 
strengthe11 their consumer protecti011 
policies." These principles are written as 
high-minded but vague and controversial 
notions of consumer "rights" that govern-
ments are to insure. The list is impressive 
and includes the right to: 
• "physical safety franz dangerous goods 
cmd services" 
• "ecmwmic safety from offe11ces or 
malpractices" that deny benefits to 
co11su me rs 
• conswner informatiol1 and education 
• "available and effective redress" 
• form consumer groups and have these 
groups' views represented in "the 
decision-maki11g process" 
At first blush, most of these principles or 
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"rights" seem to be admirable and worthy. 
But even if some kind of consensus could be 
reached on them, we must remember that 
they do not materialize out of thin air. 
Making them a reality is not automatic. In 
each case, they imply a substantial expan-
sion of the role of government, at least in 
the economies now based on markets and 
competition. 
Furthermore, nowhere do the Guidelines 
stipulate that there are costs attached to the 
litany of benefits. A sense of balance be-
tween costs and benefits (and between costs 
and effectiveness) is essential-especially in 
less developed nations where resources are 
so limited. The achievement of greater physi-
cal safety, for example, involves added costs 
in producing or distributing a product, par-
ticularly if the goal is anything approaching 
the idyllic "zero risk" notion embedded in 
much existing consumer protection 
legislation. 
We have learned the lesson that govern-
ment-mandated safety standards raise the 
Govem111e11t-mandated safety stmulards raise 
the price of products-and "price out" of 
the market some of the most 
vulnerable consumers 
price of products-and, as a result, "price 
out" of the market some of the most 
vulnerable consumers (e.g., those with low 
incomes). Ironically, such "pricing out" leads 
to greater consumer risk. For example, 
requiring a safer but more expensive ladder 
than those now in common usage would 
probably cause many people to climb on 
chairs and tables instead-a much riskier 
approach than using existing ladders, with 
whatever shortcomings they possess. 
Thus, product safety regulation can be an 
imperfect and even self-defeating tool. More-
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over, individual beliefs of what is proper or 
adequate safety protection are not absolute. 
The world over, some people want more 
safety in a product, while some people may 
settle for less. In certain instances, people 
require-or at least are willing to pay for-a 
great deal of safety from a step-ladder or an 
appliance or a tool; in other instances, 
consumers do not. 
Who, then, is going to decide what consti-
tutes "physical safety," as set forth in these 
Guidelines? Who is going to decide what are 
"dangerous goods and services"? In terms of 
number of injuries, few consumer products 
can compete with the kitchen knife. Clearly, 
the usefulness of many products leads each 
of us to accept a reasonable amount of risk 
in our daily lives-and that varies among 
individuals. 
Similarly, criticisms may be made about 
the statement in the Guidelines of "the right 
to such information as is 11ecessarv i11 order 
to make informed choices." Trans~1itting 
information about goods and services is a 
worthy goal, if the information is useful and 
accurate. But the task needs to be carefully 
approached. Just take a look at the maze of 
fine print that is often required on products 
in this country-fine print which results 
from the regulator's simple-minded notion 
that more information is always better than 
less. It is important to realize that market 
economies reduce the need for specific prod-
uct information. Producers of goods and 
services know that they have a reputation at 
stake in their brand names; it is in their 
interest to maintain a high quality in what 
they produce rather than to provide volum-
inous (and often unused) "information." 
As for the "right to consumer education," 
the U.N. Guidelines show the same high-
handed attitude toward educational systems 
as they do toward economic systems. 
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Consumers in less developed countries may, 
in fact, need a great deal of education with 
regard to products and services-but they 
may need basic educational skills, such as 
literacy, much more. As an educator, I am 
naturally suspicious whenever outside inter-
ests attempt to dictate the contents of a 
curriculum. The results are usually ineffec-
tive utilization of scarce educational 
resources. 
A questioning attitude also must be taken 
Given the freque11cy with which people in 
communist countries are thrown i11 jail for 
"economic offenses" against the state, 011e 
Guideline provision is potentially 
very dangerous 
with respect to the proposed "right to avail-
able and effective redress." Apart from 
quibbling about a useful definition of what 
constitutes "effective redress" at an interna-
tional level, we would have to examine 
whether a new claims court, or something 
on that order, would duplicate or override 
existing legal systems. That is just one 
illustration among many of the dangers 
inherent in using broad, sweeping language 
in setting forth new policies at the interna-
tional level. 
One general principle in the Guidelines 
raises grave concerns: 
the right to ecmwmic safety from offenses 
or malpractices which deny COI1swners 
optimum benefit within their economic 
resources. 
Taken at face value, this is merely gibberish. 
But given the frequency with which people 
in communist countries are thrown in jail 
for so-called "economic offenses" against the 
state, this provision is potentially very 




what are "offenses and malpractices" and the 
point at which consumers have derived 
"optimum benefit" from resources? If this 
so-called principle does anything, it shows 
that the list of "rights" is a matter for each 
nation to decide. 
Further, the related principle that 
"trw1s1wtio1wl corporati011s should co11fonn 
to 11atimwl and intematimwl standards for 
consumer protection" is not only vague in its 
stated purpose, but blatantly discriminatory. 
Why are "transnational corporations" 
singled out for special attention, and not all 
enterprises? I can only conclude that trans-
nationals are focused upon in these 
Guidelines as a scapegoat. 
The one-sidedness of the Guidelines is 
further indicated in the "right" of consumer 
organizations "to be consulted and to have 
their views represe11ted in the decision-
making process." The Guidelines make no 
provision for representing the views of the 
very businesses that are regulated. In fact, 
this U.N. document is not written from the 
viewpoint of free-market societies: it speaks 
of "the decisio11-making process," as though 
only one can exist. That, I believe, is the 
give-away. These Guidelines are not intended 
for free market, private-enterprise econom-
ies; they are designed for a centralized, 
planned economy in which the national 
government makes the key economic 
decisions. 
Further Implications of the Guidelines 
It is useful to list some of the specific 
Guidelines and let them speak for them-
selves. Do any of these sound like regulatory 
areas in which the United Nations should be 
involved in at all? 
It is the responsibility of the mwmfacturer 
to ei1Sure that goods produced are ade-
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quately safe for intended a11d 110nnal use. 
It is the respo11Sibility of the importer or 
distributor to ensure that no U11Safe goods 
are brought 011to the market . ... 
Govemments should ... e11sure that the 
il1lended level of safety is met . .. through 
compliance with safety regulatioi1S, 
national or i11temati01wl stw1dards, and 
voluntary agreements, and by requiring the 
maintenance of exact safety records. 
The Guidelines are not meant for our kind of 
economy. In our form of society, govern-
ments do not "ensure" safety or determine 
an "intended" level of safety. Also, the 
Guidelines ask governments to create paper-
work mills "by requiring the maintenw1ce of 
exact safety records." There is no indication 
of having learned from experience in the 
United States with agencies such as the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion. OSHA has been cutting back its 
paperwork requirements after learning that 
so much of its initial, onerous recordkeeping 
requirements were not needed. 
If I want to buy something silly for my 
wife's birthday, I could wind up violating 
a U.N. policy 
There are other provisions worthy of our 
attention. Here are several Guidelines listed 
under "protection of economic interest": 
Government policies should seek to e11sure 
that consumers obtai11 the maximum 
be11efit from their economic resources. 
Does not this describe the United Nations as 
a global "nanny"? Extending this notion to 
its "illogical conclusion," if I want to buy 
something silly for my wife's birthday, I 
could wind up violating a U.N. policy. 
Here's another provision: 
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Producers should ensure the availability of 
reliable after-sales service. 
From the standpoint of economics, this 
Guideline is total nonsense. It also probably 
runs afoul of our antitrust laws. Why pre-
sume that service must be provided by the 
producer, unless a sale is a non-competitive, 
tie-in sale? Production and service, after all, 
are not necessarily provided best by the 
same source-at least this is true in compe-
titive, open markets. Moreover, is this prop-
erly a concern of the United Nations? In the 
United States, we do not consider this an 
area for government regulation at all. 
The same criticisms apply to the following 
Guideline: 
Govemments should formulate and put 
into effect national codes on marketing 
and other business practices to ei1Sure that 
such practices are fair to consumers. Con-
swner organizatioi1S should participate i11 
the elaboration and monitoring of such 
codes. 
The demand for "national codes" such as 
those mentioned here completely ignores the 
fact that several member nations of the U.N. 
have a federal form of government in which 
the powers of the national government are 
limited. Examples include the United States, 
Australia, Canada, and West Germany. 
Two other Guidelines in the category of 
"protection of economic interests" again 
cast the shadow of "Big Brother." One is the 
following: 
Governments should inte11Sify their efforts 
to prevent economic offenses through sys-
tematically monitoring the adhere11ce to 
the established laws and standards by pro-
ducers, distributors w1d others i11volved in 
the provision of goods and services. 
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It goes on to state that consumer groups 
"should be encouraged and supported in 
monitoring economic offenses." What is the 
true meaning and purpose of a provision 
such as this one? What sort of government 
systematically monitors the actions of pri-
vate citizens? What sort of government en-
courages and supports specific private 
The authors of the Guidelines have little 
i11terest i11 either economic freedom or 
perso1wl liberty 
groups in monitoring other private groups, 
as though they were licensed vigilantes? It is 
obvious that the authors of the Guidelines 
have little interest in either economic free-
dom or personal liberty. 
Another suspect Guideline is the following: 
Govemments should c011sider adopting a 
specific policy for improvi11g the distribu-
ti011 system for essential consumer goods 
and services, particularly in rural areas. 
Why only rural areas? But beyond that, 
what amount of choice does such a provision 
allow for? Who is going to decide what are 
the "essential" goods and services? 
Guidelines Relating to Specific Industries 
It is also helpful to examine the Guidelines 
which have been proposed for specific indus-
tries. Here is one example: 
Govemments, whe11 fonnulati11g national 
policies and plans with regard to food pro-
duction and distribution, should take into 
accmmt the needs of all consumer groups. 
Such policies m1d plans should i11ter alia 
provide for adequate post-harvest handling, 
storage, processi11g m1d distribution and 
should include mechm1isms for appropriate 
activity in the case of seasonal fluctuation 
in food supply and prices. 
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Again, let us look at the true meaning of a 
Guideline such as this one. How is a govern-
ment going to take into account the needs of 
"all" consumer groups unless, in fact, it 
identifies and controls their "needs"? What 
possible role could private enterprise play in 
such a process? Certainly a very small one, 
since carrying out the Guideline will inevi-
tably require centralized planning. The same 
applies to "adequate post-harvest handling," 
and so forth, since a central government 
would have to direct those processes. But 
perhaps the most disturbing part of this pro-
vision is the bureaucratic language about 
"mechanisms for appropriate activity i11 the 
case of seasonal fluctuation i11 food supply 
and price." Plainly and simply, this means 
price controls and export and import re-
straints. This Guideline is totally inconsis-
tent with the workings of a modern, private 
enterprise economy. 
The Guidelines' disregard of the market 
system is further displayed in two provisions 
under national strategies "for food safety 
and quality co11trol." One of these states: 
Food co11taminatio11 m011itoring and C011-
trol programmes should be established or 
strengthened ... 
This Guideline gives absolutely no indication 
that some countries have already done this-
and done it quite well without the United 
Nations. Instead, what we have here is a 
simple-minded assertion and the belief, as al-
ways in these draft Guidelines, that more is 
better than less-more regulation, more 
intervention and control, more power in a 
central government. Food standards-or "re-
medial actions" in the words of the Guide-
line-can be used by a nation to justify the 
erection of barriers to international trade. 
Finally, we see once again how the market-
place gets superseded in another section 
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concerning food: 
Business practices affecti11g the processing 
and distribution of food products andes-
pecially the marketing of highly refined 
and expensive food products should be 
regulated in order to e1uure that such prac-
tices do 110t co11flict with consumers' in-
terests or govemme111 aims in the area of 
food policy. 
Who is going to judge the so-called "con-
flict" between consumers' interests and busi-
ness practices? In free societies with market 
economies, if there is a "conflict," consum-
ers protect their interests by not buying the 
product. Resorting to regulation may simply 
project "government aims" in food policy-
and that is probably the true purpose of this 
provision. Moreover, why are "highly refined 
and expensive food products" singled out 
here? What all-wise power in a nation is 
going to determine that a specific categm-y 
of food products presents a "conflict" with 
the interests of consumers, while another 
category does not? When we recall that 
meeting the safety and other standards will 
increase the price of many products, it is ap-
parent that this focus on expensive products 
may be the closest thing to a perpetual mo-
tion machine guaranteed to result in even 
more regulation. 
The Central Role of the U.N. 
International regulation of the production 
and distribution of goods and services via 
these Guidelines is a far cry from the basic 
role of the United Nations-which is, ac-
cording to the U.N. charter, "to maintain in-
ternational peace and security." That role 
deserves the greatest amount of emphasis in 
the dangerous world in which we live. 
Frankly, it is sad to see the U.N. diverting its 
attention to large-scale forms of economic 
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regulation when it is doing such an inade-
quate job of carrying out the basic task for 
which it was established. 
It is sad to see the U.N. diverting its 
attentio11 when it is doing such an 
inadequate job of carrying out the basic 
task for which it was established 
Above all, its charter explicitly prohibits 
the United Nations from intervening "in 
matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state." Much of 
the Consumer Protection Guidelines involves 
just such intervention-and on a massive 
scale. 
Conclusion 
To recapitulate, in this report I have at-
tempted to make three main points: (1) the 
U.N. Guidelines would impose centralized 
control on the economies of sovereign na-
tions, (2) the United Nations should focus in-
stead on its fundamental role of peace-
keeper, and (3) the U.N. should not assume 
the role of global "nanny" and international 
consumer "cop." 
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